MAC Layer Key Hierarchies and Establishment Procedures

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17.11.2006

Agenda

- 1. Introduction and Background
- 2. Pair-wise associations
- 3. Group associations
- 4. Different layers
- 5. Conclusions

Introduction

- Key negotiation methods and hierarchies based on standards
- WiMedia's UWB
 - Short range radio platform
 - Speeds up to 480 Mbit/s
 - For example Wireless USB
- WLAN
 - Set of standards
 - Speeds up to 540 Mbit/s (802.11n)

Key exchange in different layers

- MAC-layer
 - For example the standards in the paper
- Upper layers
 - For example MANAprotocols
- Keys need to be distributed between the levels

Application Layer

Presentation Layer

Session Layer

Transport Layer

Network Layer

MAC Layer

Physical Layer

Pair-wise keys

- Both standards use a pre-shared key (PSK)
 - Also known as pair-wise master key (PMK)
- Devices exchange random nonces using a 4-way handshake
- Keys are derived from the PMK and random nonces
 - Also information such as addresses are used


UWB 4-way handshake (1/2)

- Initiator and Responder
- PMK is identified by master key identifier (MKID)
- PTK is identified by temporal key identifier (TKID)
 - Unique at the moment
- Devices exchange fresh random nonces
- After the devices have exhanged the data, the derive the keys using pseudo-random function
 - Pair-wise temporal key (PTK)
 - Key confirmation key (KCK)

\mathbf{UWB}	4-way handshake	(2/2)
Initiator		Responder
РМК		РМК
Generate I-Nonce	(MKID, TKID, I-Nonce)	
		Generate R-Nonce prf(PMK I-Nonce R-Nonce
<	(R-Nonce, PTK-MIC _{KCK})	
prf(PMK I-Nonce R-Nonce) 	(I-Nonce, PTK-MIC _{кск})	
	(R-Nonce, PTK-MIC _{KCK})	


WLAN 4-way handshake (1/2)

- Authenticator and Supplicant
- Associations can be built between two stations or between a station and an access point
 - Ad-hoc or infrastructure mode
- Devices share pair-wise master key security association (PMKSA) identified using PMKID
- From known and exchaned material devices derive three keys: Key confirmation key (KCK), key encryption key (KEK) and temporal key (TK)



What about groups?

- Both standards provides means to negotiate multicast groups
- Groups are built using pair-wise associations
- Groups are unidirectional
 - Same key is never used for encryption and decryption
 - A device distributes the key it uses for encryption, the recipients save the key to use for decryption



Distribution of group keys


- UWB
 - Devices exchange group keys after the handshake is performed
 - Possible to exchange keys using one association
- WLAN
 - Devices send the group key in the third message of the handshake
 - To exchange key to both directions, two associations must be built
 - Also provides so called Group Key handshake

Key hierarchies

Pair-wise master key (long term)			
Pair-wise temporal key (short term)			
PTK	KCK	[KEK]	
[Group master key (short term)]			
Group temporal key (short term)			


Negotiation of PMKs


• The PSK can be negotiated using upper layer protocols





Forming groups on upper layers


- WLAN in ad-hoc mode or UWB
- Make devices share same PSK
 - Devices use the same PSK to derive the pair-wise keys
 - The PSK identifies the group
 - * An attacker is not able to force devices to belong to a group without they knowing
 - Each device possessing the key can take new members
 - Only devices having the same key can join the group













Issues

- Revoking a device
 - All devices (are able to) know all secrets
 - New associations must be built in the upper levels
- What if we use pair-wise associations on the upper level?

Group Keys using pair-wise associations





Conclusions

- Group key negotiation has its problems
- The standards don't provide perfect forward secrecy
- The methods seem to be appriopriate for deriving session keys

Thank You!

Questions?